Such strong-worded allegations leave me with no choice but to ask for the readers' patience so that I may present and discuss the evidence whose interpretation or existence is being questioned. An empirical refutation of what Shank presents as his three most serious accusations will be followed by an analysis of his interpretive framework. I plan to show that an a priori rejection of my claims about the importance of the social legitimation of scientific claims and professional roles has lead him to believe that, if my arguments about the relationship between Galileo's social and cognitive legitimation seem credible, it must be because I have played with the evidence.
Cosimo, Jupiter, and Saturn
The pivotal point of Shank's review is that, contrary to my claims, there is no evidence of a link between Jupiter and Cosimo I (the grandfather of Cosimo II, Galileo's patron) in the mythological narratives developed by the Medici about the allegedly divine connections of their family and the legitimacy of their power. I have argued that the link between Cosimo I and Jupiter was important to Galileo's dedication of his discovery of the satellites of Jupiter to the Medici, and that it contributed to convincing them that heard it said by the duke my lord, there is an elaborate composition and grand imaginative invention to the work as a whole.9
Vasari responds with a lengthy discussion of how the restructuring of these two apartments epitomizes the very process through which the Medici have reformed the old, decaying, and disorganized Florence into a coherent and content political body. He concludes,
In several places apartments and other useful, lavish quarters were rebuilt according to a new order upon these old bones; and the scattered limbs of these old rooms were converted into a single body. Consistent with the stories painted in the rooms and halls, they were named for the celestrial gods upstairs and for the illustrious men of the Medici house downstairs.10
The unity of the project and the structural relation between the two levels is repeated at the beginning of the description of the
Apartments of Leo X:
Vasari: Since you've come to pass the time looking at the stories painted in the halls and rooms downstairs about the terrestrial gods of the illustrious house of Medici, it seems to me (if it please Your Excellency) that before we go further with our discourse I must explain why we put high up in these rooms the origin and stories of the celestial gods, along with the properties they display according to their nature. It is because those in the downstairs rooms are to follow the very same plan. There is nothing painted above which does not correspond to what is here below.
Francesco: Do you mean by these stories, then, that the ancestors of our house also partook of the qualities of the celestial gods, as you showed me regarding the duke my lord? This would indeed by a double scheme and I should have thought it sufficient were they to serve only one purpose, let alone many! Certainly, it will be quite an accomplishment. Therefore, not only Vasari's text provides much more than "a statement about the painting upstairs corresponding to those downstairs," but it also shows that, according to his grand plan, the correspondence between the rooms of specific gods and specific Medici "heroes" (and thus between Cosimo I and Jupiter) was far from being accidental.'3
Mythologies and competences
Shank then claims that because Vasari's interlocutor does not seem to be aware of the mythological iconography presented by the painter, these narratives, far from being commonly known, were not familiar even to the Medici themselves. A simple chronology is sufficient to answer Shank's criticism.
Vasari began to write the Ragionamenti around 1558, but the text was completed and published by his nephew in 1588, after the painter's death. Vasari's nephew dedicated it to Ferdinand, who was then a cardinal and soon to become Grand Duke Ferdinand I and the father of Cosimo II. However, as shown by the very title of the Ragionamenti, Vasari's interlocutor was not Grand Duke Ferdinand (as Shank alleges) but his brother, Prince Francesco.14 If we couple this piece of information with Vasari's claim (contained in the same text) that the dialogue took place in 1558, it turns out that Prince Francesco was only seventeen years old at that time. Shank also has missed the important fact (widely discussed in the literature) that the Ragionamenti is a fictional account of a visit that, quite likely, never happened. Vasari organized the narrative around a well-known form of dialogue: that between the inexperienced pupil and his wise teacher. This genre allowed Vasari to sing his own praises by having the young prince express his surprise at and appreciation of the skills and iconographic virtuosity of the painter, thus confirming his desired status as the great Medici "media advisor." Therefore, even if the real Francesco had known something about those narratives and had actually discussed them with the painter (which I strongly doubt), Vasari might still have represented him as being ignorant. The homology between Jupiter and Cosimo I continues with the story of how Jupiter added Capricorn to the zodiacal signs in gratitude to Amalthea (depicted as the goat that nourished him):
[Jupiter] included the goat among the twelve signs of the zodiac, joining to its middle the form of a fish's tail, with the benignity of the seven stars over its horns [Capricorn was Cosimo's sign and his most used symbol]. These denote the seven gifts of the Spirit of God which care for the duke, and also the three theological and four moral virtues which he loves so well... Toward 21 Shank, "Galileo's Day," 240. 22 Draper, Vasari's Decoration, 126-7, emphasis mine. these stars also incline the seven planets, which are supporters of the seven liberal arts in which His Excellency takes such delight.24
The rest of Vasari's text speaks for itself:
Vasari: [...] They have given it the name Capricorn, the sign bestowed by astrologers as appropriate to the greatness of illustrious princes and their descendants. As it was for Augustus, so it is again for our duke Cosimo with the same seven stars. Just as it affected Augustus's reign over all the world, it is also seen working daily in His Excellency, magnifying him so that he grows in greatness and is all but King of Tuscany. It happened that, against the will and thinking of some individuals, he was made Duke of Florence. In that instance he made use not only of his sign, or animal, but of all forty-eight signs of heaven, that is, the forty-eight citizens who elected him Prince and Duke of Florence after the death of Duke Alessandro. Vasari: The shepherd represents the good prince [Cosimo], who takes care that his people are well led and governed. As the good shepherd defends his flocks from wolves, so too this prince protects his people from corrupt judges and evil men. The oak as I mentioned stands for strength, since this prince has made the whole state very strong today and makes it more so day by day. Just as Jupiter provided grain for those who were living on acorns, so the duke provides for us today who live with so many pleasures. For this we must give thanks to our great God, who favors us for being obedient to this prince, so that in all times his bees drip honey on us, which comes from the bees born of the oak, as I have painted here. I said above that Jupiter drove his fathers who wanted to kill him from his kingdom. The duke also, helped by the goodness of God, has scattered from his realm the false wolves who have tried to hinder his government, striking the giants, that is, the proud, with lightning. And that they might not move, he buried them under mountains of good works in the greatness of his glory [this is a reference to Jupiter's defeat of the Titans]. He has constructed grand fortresses throughout his dominion, not only for servants, who derive benefit and honor from living in them. He has always called men of talent to his country, rewarding generously those brave in battle; and he has formed the Order of the Bands for the people of his state, teaching the uninitiated the art of war. He has shown hospitality to all the great lords who have come to visit Florence. He has firmly decided disputes. Those who have brought some innovation or benefit to his city through their industry he has rewarded, and he too has invented many useful things for his people. Indeed he is the ultimate father of all virtue. He has taken the eagle of Jupiter as a sign and omen for destroying his enemies, and it has accompanied his path and embraced his flag, affirming his state and enlarging it greatly.25 Vasari: Next is Jupiter's division of the sky, in which he took the greatest realm of the three. Similarly, our duke has taken the government of the state of Florence in order to make you prince and duke over it, so that after him you may show the virtue of your soul worthy of so honored and rich a present. That you may begin soon, he will give you dominion over Siena. By that grace which rains from heaven, ecclesiastical matters will be sustained by Don Giovanni, those of the sea by Don Garzia. And the rest of the kingdoms which are acquired will be bestowed upon your illustrious brothers. Much as Jupiter gave other reigns to his relatives and friends, your great father, no less virtuous, has been similarly generous in giving away many places to his friends.... The only other passage I have found in Vasari which draws an analogy (rather than a genealogical relationship) between the two is from the Room of the Elements:
For just as the people present the first fruits of the earth to Saturn, so will our duke's subjects come at all times bearing their hearts and their deeds to give him tribute of their souls and substance in his need. And in every season he will keep the country in abundance, or if it is lacking, he will make the shepherds of the sea and the tritons come carrying wood nymphs; that is, he will commission full ships and galleys, bringing provisions and merchandise of every kind from plentiful places in If my argument is not based on an inference from one or more causes it is because that's not how court imagery works. As Vasari put it, his stories were articulated in a way which resembled poetry rather than philosophy.52 It is the historian's task to reconstruct such a "poetic logic." For instance, that Cosimo could be linked both to Jupiter and Saturn (in different ways and with different emphases), does not mean that these associations were too fluid to be meaningful or that Vasari's narratives were simply inconsistent. Such a reading would result only from a perspective which attributes law-like status to isolated statements and then sees anomalies to those "laws" everywhere. A much different picture emerges once we understand the genealogy of these associations within the process that developed and used them.
Far from being timeless statements, dynastic mythologies changed in time so as to maximize the match between the ruler's gestae and those of mythological gods, or to represent his achievements as the "natural" outcome of his fate (as ruled by divine connections, astrological dispositions, or both). Cosimo was not al- In the Assayer, Galileo tells the story of a man who, in the process of investigating the cause of a certain sound, finds that nature is able to produce it through a variety of very different means. As his inquiry proceeds, he comes to believe that he may be able to find the one true cause of the sound, not just its many manifestations. Eventually, he comes upon a cicada and thinks that the shaking of certain hard ligaments in its chest may be the cause he was seeking. However, as he tries to break the ligaments to stop the sound and prove his hypothesis, he kills the cicada without solving the puzzle.
I have read this as a moral tale through which Galileo criticizes the wrong-headed method of pedantic thinkers who do not ac- Neither Sig. Mario [Guiducci] nor I ever wrote that fuming vapors rise from some parts of the earth to the moon... What Sig. Mario did write is that he does not consider it impossible that sometimes there may be raised from the earth exhalations and other such things so much subtler than usual that they would ascend even to the moon, and might be material for the formation of a comet [i.e., that nature has the power to produce the phenomenon of comets that way too]; and that sometimes there occur unusual sublimations of the twilight material, as exemplified by the aurora borealis. But he does not say that this is identical with the material of comets... Likewise, straight motion is attributed to the same material only with probability and not with certainty. This is said not to retreat in fear of Sarsi's objections, but merely to let it be seen that we are not departing from out custom of declaring nothing as certain except what we know beyond doubt...58
The same line of argument informs the previous two pages: [.. .] now it seems to me that he [Grassi] proceeds to shape conclusions in order to oppose them as ideas belonging to Sig. Mario and me, though they are quite different from those set forth in Sig. Mario's Discourse, or at least differently construed. That the comet is beyond doubt a mere image has never been positively affirmed; it has merely been raised as a question... Here are Sig. Mario's words in this connection: "I do not say positively that a comet is formed in this way, but I do say that just as there are doubts about this, so there are doubts about the methods used by other authors..." With similar distortion, Sarsi [Grassi] represents us as having definitely declared that the motion of the comet must necessarily be straight and perpendicular to the earth's surface, something which is not proposed in that way but is merely brought under consideration in that it would explain the changes observed in the comet more simply and in better agreement with the appearances.59
Three pages before the fable of sound, Galileo criticizes Grassi for the overconfidence he displays in his own beliefs about the nature of comets-a type of arrogance predicated on the disregard of nature's ability to produce a given phenomenon in a variety of ways:
... [Grassi] says that to anyone who had once looked at the comet no other argument would be necessary to prove the nature of its light; for compared with other true lights it showed itself only too clearly to be true and not spurious... I confess that I do not have such a perfect discriminatory faculty... 58 Galilei, Assayer, 233-4. For my part, I have countless times been in some room with closed shutters and have seen on the opposite wall the reflection of sunlight coming through some tiny hole, and as far as vision could tell, I have judged it to be a star, no less bright than Venus or the Dog Star. When we walk over a field toward the sun, in how many thousands of straws and pebbles, a little polished or moistened, will the reflection of the sun be seen in the aspect of the most splendid stars? Sarsi has to spit upon the ground, and undoubtedly he will see the aspect of a natural star from that point toward which the sun's rays are reflected."
Galileo's criticism of Grassi in this passage closely resembles his argument against the methodology of the man in the fable. Like that man who believed he had found the true cause of a given sound, Grassi believes he has figured out the true nature of the comets. Galileo, instead, represents himself as somebody who knows nothing final about comets, but is content to realize that nature can produce that phenomenon in many different ways. Although, unlike Galileo, Grassi and the man of the fable do not stop at hypotheses, they still do not achieve the positive knowledge they seek. The man of the fable kills the cicada and learns nothing about sound, while Grassi "kills" Galileo's hypotheses Let me now show how Galileo's remarks about the character of the man in the fable can be easily explained within my interpretive framework. The man in the fable behaves like Grassi during his inquiry into the causes of sound. However, whereas Grassi learns nothing from his mistakes and is represented as an unreformed pedant throughout the book, the man of the fable seems shocked by the death of the cicada and by the realization of his cognitive failure, events that force him to rethink his approach: "Thereupon [the cicada's death] his knowledge was reduced to such diffidence that when asked how sound are generated he used to reply tolerantly that although he knew some of the ways, he was certain that many more existed which were unknown and unimaginable. My focus here was on the tension between Galileo's assertion that he had the "impenetrable shield of truth" (i.e., that his claims about buoyancy were true), and his simultaneous awareness that his shield, while preventing him from being killed, did not seem to be enough to end the dispute since his adversaries kept attacking him. As he put it, he was "for the rest naked and unarmed." This fits well with my argument that in a social system of science in which the practitioners had few institutionalized protocols to resolve disputes and adjudicate claims, the prince's intervention Several of Shank's critical remarks reflect a systematic dismissal of the process I see linking cognitive and social legitimation. He seems to assume that the legitimation of claims cannot be the result of a process, because true statements carry within themselves the causes of their own eventual acceptance.68 Consequently, he rules out that patronage may have played a role in the legitimation of Galileo's claims (as they were already legitimate) or in motivating his career (as all his motives came directly from his belief in the truth of his claims).69 Galileo "had legitimacy; he wanted recognition."70 Because of this outlook, Shank dismisses my discussion of the modalities of the interaction between cognitive and social legitimation (or between scientific commitments and patronage concerns) and casts me either as somebody who simply conflates the two, or who believes that the acceptance of a claim is ultimately effected by extra-scientific causes. As he puts it: "the expression 'social and epistemological legitimation' frequently occurs as a unit, 68 If statements can singlehandedly cause actions, then the context of their production and deployment may seem unessential to explain such results.
69 "The asymmetries and contrasts between mathematics and philosophy that purportedly motivate Galileo's social and epistemological ascent are largely artefacts of several authorial decisions." Shank, "Galileo's Day," 237, and "This pre-existent 'Jupiter mythology' allegedly motivates Galileo's patronage strategy, and explains Cosimo's appointment of him as court mathematician and philosopher." Shank, "Galileo's Day," 240, emphases mine. empty. Also, if that hierarchy does not exist, Galileo's actions cannot be said to have been driven by a desire to overcome a gap that was epistemological and social at the same time, but only by the truth of his beliefs.74 Social and scientific ambitions would not mix. My first allegedly tendentious "authorial decision" was not to consider Galileo's work on mechanics (which I deal with only in the context of the dispute on buoyancy). Shank believes that, had I looked more carefully at Galileo's mechanics, I would have understood that "in Galileo's own mind, it was precisely this natural philosophical work that made him worthy of the title of granducal philosopher: he had 'studied more years in philosophy than months in pure mathematics,' as he wrote in 1610 to Belisario Vinta, the Medici secretary of state."75
The relationship between this sentence and the argument it purports to refute is a mysterious one. Shank's claim indicates that Galileo's work in mechanics (which fell into the category of mixed, not pure, mathematics) and his investigation into the causes of motion (a philosophical topic) led him to question the hierarchy between mathematics and philosophy, and to believe that his mechanics should have the status of natural philosophy. This is precisely what I argue again and again in Chapters 3 and 4. Shank's puzzling criticism suggests that he may be treating Galileo's self-perception as a philosopher as a sufficient cause of (rather than an important resource for) his eventual achievement of that title through grand ducal patronage. As in his reading of Vasari, Shank's causal outlook makes him forget the significance of the context. While he acknowledges that the quote he presents is from a letter from Galileo to the Medici secretary, he does not seem to notice that in that letter Galileo was precisely negotiating his title and position at the Florentine court. Quite clearly, that Galileo was representing himself as a philosopher does not mean that he was publicly recognized as being one, but simply that he was "pitching" himself to Vinta in the process of having his self-perception recognized by the Medici.
According to Shank, my second tendentious "authorial decision" was to have singled out the views of Galileo's opponents during the debate on buoyancy as paradigmatic of the philosophers' dismissive views of the cognitive status of mathematics. This evi-dence (which he does not challenge) is outweighewd in his mind by the fact that, over the centuries, there have been people who have questioned the cognitive gap between philosophy and mathematics.76 Shank's point is as true as it is irrelevant. That in other places and times there were philosophers who were more appreciative of mathematics than Delle Colombe and his cohorts did not solve Galileo's problems, because Galileo had to deal precisely with Delle Colombe and his cohorts.77 b. Polarity versus change
The logical structure of Shank's rejection of the relationship between cognitive and social legitimation seems to reflect a more general disposition to deny that two things can be simultaneously different and yet connected through a process. 77 The structure of Shank's argument is analogous to that of his previous critique of the significance of the Jupiter-Cosimo association. In both cases, he takes me to make law-like statements when, instead, I am simply presenting, respectively, a contextual resource and a contextual constraint. He then proceeds to "refute" my allegedly law-like statements by finding counter-instances. In the former case, he construes the Cosimo-Saturn relationship as such a refutation. In the latter, he perceives in the mathematics-friendly stances of some people who were not involved in that dispute (and who often lived in other countries and centuries) as undermining my claim. Also, in both cases, the "refuting" evidence is produced through a very selective reading of either primary sources or the secondary literature, as indicated by Shank's dismissal the sizeable literature on the longstanding distinction between mathematics and natural philosophy I cite in the book (i.e., the work of Westman, Jardine, Dear, Crombie, Baldini, and Giacobbe). The flip side of Shank's disposition to deny that two categories can be different and yet related is found in his tendency to interpret descriptions of differences as being statements about law-like dichotomies. For instance, he takes my description of the strong differences between court and university cultures as meaning that the two were sealed off from each other (allegedly like mathematics and philosophy). Once he has construed my claim as a dichotomy, he then proceeds to argue that such dichotomy is untenable:
It is difficult to take this schema seriously if one knows that Galileo grew up in a patronage environment (the Bardi Camerata and the Jacopo Corsi group), attended the University of Pisa (effectively the Medici university), learned mathematics with a Medici court tutor, obtained a university position in mathematics first at Pisa, then at Padua (after first offending a Medici and receiving the grand duke's permission to leave Tuscany), tutored the young Cosimo while teaching at Padua, and moved to Florence as grand ducal mathematician and philosopher and as extraordinary professor of mathematics at Pisa.83 I cannot agree more with Shank's evidence because it is precisely what I present and discuss in the book. However, I do not use this evidence to claim that there was an absolute dichotomy between court and university, but to show that Galileo was able to move through these two different environments in a trajectory that eventually landed him were he desired to land: at court. Instead, according to Shank's logic, if somebody travels between two countries and knows his/her way around in both, we cannot say that those countries are very different because that would be an untenable dichotomical statement. 81 Biagioli, Galileo Courtier, 331 (emphasis mine). 82 "Galileo was a very odd courtly favorite: he spent fewer than four months in Rome during the decade that separates Maffeo Barberini's ascent to the papacy as Urban VIII from Galileo's summons to Rome by the Inquisition. As a candidate for the title of Papal favorite, Galileo does not stand a chance by comparison with genuine intimates like Bernini, Giovanni Ciampoli, or even Tommaso Campanella." (Shank, "Galileo's Day," 239). 83 Shank, "Galileo's Day," 238.
Shank's move is structurally analogous to those discussed before. There he was assuming that I was artificially conflating two categories, while here he claims that I am artificially separating them. Both cases yield the same result: I am allegedly refuted by my own evidence.84 c. Essentialism and its algorithms To summarize, Shank's reading practices seem to display a "blind spot" about processes linking specific aspects of two entities or enabling change between two different historical situations. By missing the process he ends up seeing only the two end points of the trajectory and can convince himself that I routinely present artifactual dichotomies or that I have a "reductivist" view of science (i.e., that I reduce science to power). For instance, rather than considering the possibility that the kind of arguments I am making may be about processes rather than causes, he assumes that our logic must be the same, but that I simply use "power" whenever he would use "truth" (and also assumes that my notion of power is as absolute as his notion of truth). This last step is helped by (and reinforces his confidence in) his "essentialist" reading of the evidence. Once he has reduced my arguments down to causal inferences or monolithical dichotomies, he can then "refute" them with decontextualized atoms of evidence which he has produced through analogously reductive readings of the sources. Unsurprisingly, Shank's reading snowballs into a sequence of self-fullfilling prophecies which inexora-bly reinforce his belief that he is right and that I am wrong (or worse). No wonder he can convince himself that I play with the evidence! Let me propose a few schematic reconstructions of Shank's algorithm in action:
Galileo courtier: 1) I claim that Galileo was a courtier in some ways, and not in others. I discuss a process through which he tried to put different elements of his identity together to constitute himself as a "new philosopher." 2) Shank's causal outlook casts my argument as implying that Galileo could be either a courtier or no courtier at all. 3) But Galileo could not be a courtier (as Shank's assumes that he did not need to be a courtier to gain legitimation as a philosopher). 4) But I do not say that Galileo was not a courtier. 5) So I must be saying that he was truly one. 6)1 allegedly refute myself by presenting and discussing evidence that Galileo was not a canonical courtier.
The shield of truth: 1) I claim that Cosimo's role was crucial for the legitimation of Galileo's views on buoyancy (within that specific context) by allowing him to withdraw from a deadlocked dispute. I present Galileo's scientific claims neither as irrelevant to, nor as sufficient causes of his eventual success in that specific context. 2) Shank takes me as having only two options: either I say that Galileo's claims were right and caused his success, or that he won the dispute just because of his patron's power. 3) Shank assumes that Galileo was right (he said he possessed the "shield of truth.") 4) But I do not say that Galileo victory was caused by his "shield of truth." 5) So I must be saying that grand ducal patronage was the cause of his success. 6) I am allegedly refuted by the evidence I present which indicates that Galileo thought he possessed the "shield of truth."
The man of the fable: 1) I argue that the man was a "philosophical brute" on account of his method, not character. 2) Shank assumes that the man could be either a brute or no brute at all. 3) He could not be a brute like Grassi because Galileo said nice things about him, but did not say nice things about Grassi. 4) But I do not say that the man was a good guy or that Galileo identified with him. 5) Therefore I must be saying that he was an unconditional brute. 6)1 am allegedly refuted by my own text. First, I cite a passage by Galileo in which he also said that the man in the fable was a good guy. Second, according to Shank, "Astonishingly, Biagioli does allude to Galileo as the protagonist of the fable at the end of Chapter 6," though, of course, I am talking about something altogether different.86
Galileo favorite: 1) I claim that some features (but not others) of Galileo's role resembled those of the court favorite, and that the process known as the fall of the favorite might cast some light on some aspects of his trial (but not on others). 2) Two options: either Galileo was a real favorite or no favorite at all. 3) Galileo could not be a favorite (because, allegedly, he was not even a courtier). 4) But I do not say that Galileo was not a favorite, or that I use the fall of the favorite just as a metaphor. 5) Ergo, I must be saying that he is a favorite and that he fell like one. 6) But I also say that, in some ways, he was not a favorite, so I must be undermining myself.
Jupiter, Saturn, Cosimo: 1) I argue that the Cosimo-Jupiter association was a crucial resource within the process that allowed Galileo to legitimate him-self as a philosopher and gain public assent for his discoveries, but do not present it as a cause of those results. 2) Shank assumes that either the Jupiter-Cosimo link was the cause of his legitimation or it was not. If it was, then Cosimo should have been associated exclusively to Jupiter, because the existence of alternative associations would have undermined the causal status of the Jupiter-Cosimo connection. 3) According to him, the Jupiter-Cosimo link could not be a cause of legitimation because true claims do not need social legitimation. Galileo needed only "recognition." 4) But I do not say that this association was just rhetoric, a simple courtly flourish Galileo put on his claims as a cherry on an independently delicious cake. 5) Therefore, I must be saying that the Jupiter-Cosimo link was the cause that explains Galileo's success. 6) I am allegedly refuted by a passage about the Saturn-Cosimo relationship found in the very text which I present as my main source of evidence.
Conclusion
Although Shank's allegations that I "play with the evidence" were the most disturbing aspect of his review, they could be easily countered by presenting the evidence. Instead, what I found much more difficult was to understand the reasons behind his relentless misinterpretations of the sources and the sustained sense of moral distrust he displays toward my arguments.87 Because, unlike Shank, I find it hard to believe that people can be consistently irresponsible and self-sabotaging at the same time, I felt uncomfortable to adopt his own perspective and dismiss his critique as simply resulting from "playing with the evidence." 87 For instance, Shank seems to believe that my book has been craftily presented to the scholarly community: "This is a book one approaches with high expectations. The title is intriguing; the dustjacket copy promises 'radical reinterpretations' and 'close readings' of Galileo's works; the endorsements are superb" (Shank, "Galileo's Day," 236). Shank's somewhat obscure closing statement that "In the end, Biagioli's mistreatment of his sources soundly refutes his own model of legitimation: no amount of social legitimation can for long give cognitive status to tendentious inferences from misread evidence. Social and epistemological legitimation do sometimes appear to overlap, but their congruence may be brief." seems almost to imply that the endorsements of my book and the positive influence they might have on the reader are part of a cabal aimed at our professional community (Shank, "Galileo's Day," 241, emphasis mine).
I have tried, instead, to treat his essay as a historiographical puzzle, as something to be explained as the result of an interpretive protocols (and the emotions they may have elicited in the process). Understanding the logic of Shank's misreading of my texts has been laborious but, among other things, it has allowed me to clarify some of my arguments and foreground their methodological dimensions. If this exercise has not led me to revise my negative assessment of the empirical tenability and heuristic power of Shank's historiographical paradigm, it has provided me with an hypothesis about how his interpretive protocols may have led him to impute unethical motives to a text that has none. As I hope to have shown, the genealogy of Shank's accusations is a much more interesting problem than the accusations themselves. Processes are always fun.
